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Abstract
The transfer paradox describes a situation in which a transfer of
endowments between two agents results in a welfare decrease for the
recipient and a welfare increase for the donor. It is known that in
a two-agent regular exchange economy with an arbitrary number of
goods, the transfer paradox occurs only if the price equilibrium is
unstable. In this paper, we show that in the space of welfare weights,
the set of stable equilibria and the set of no-transfer paradox equilibria
coincide. As a corollary we also obtain that for two agents and an
arbitrary number of goods, the index of an equilibrium in price space
coincides with its index in welfare space.
JEL codes: D51, D60
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we show that in a two agent economy with an arbitrary number
of goods, the transfer paradox occurs if and only if the equilibrium is unstable
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in welfare space. In this introduction, we position our paper in the literature
and discuss the intuition behind the mechanics of the transfer paradox in
welfare space.
The transfer paradox. The transfer paradox takes place in a two agent
exchange economy, when a transfer from the rst agent to the second leads
to a gain of welfare for the donor and a loss in welfare for the recipient.
The mechanism underlying the transfer paradox is well known. Given that
a redistribution of resources not only shifts the endowments, but also the
equilibrium prices, it is possible that the positive income eect for the donor
is outweighed by a negative price eect, and therefore makes her worse o.
The existence of the transfer paradox was rst noticed by Leontief (1947).
Shortly afterwards, Samuelson (1952, 1954) demonstrated (in a two agent
and two commodity exchange economy) that a transfer paradox can only
occur if the initial equilibrium is ta^tonnement unstable.1 Since then, many
variations of the transfer paradox have been studied. The focus was par-
ticular on the use of specic preferences and the impact of variations in the
number of goods and the number of agents; see for instance Gale (1974), Bal-
asko (1975), Chichilnisky (1980) and Bhagwati, Brecher, and Hatta (1983),
Geanakoplos and Heal (1983), Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1983), Chichilnisky
(1983), Polemarchakis (1983) and Safra (1984).2
Recently, Balasko (2014) provided the rst complete characterization of
the transfer paradox. He showed that in a two agent exchange model, with an
arbitrary number of commodities and arbitrary (well-behaved) preferences,
the transfer paradox can occur at a regular equilibrium if and only if the
equilibrium has an index value of  1. Given that equilibria with index value
 1 are ta^tonnement unstable (the reverse is not always true if the number of
goods is larger than two) this shows that the transfer paradox cannot occur
at a stable equilibrium.
Equilibria in price and welfare space. The usual procedure to nd
equilibria in an exchange economy is by rst deriving the oer curves for
the agents in the economy, i.e. the individual excess demands as a function
1See also Mundell (1960), Balasko (1978), Postlewaite and Webb (1984).
2There were also many other extensions focusing on whether oer curves are elastic
(Majumdar and Mitra (1985), Yano (1983), Dixit (1983)), whether goods are substitutes
or complements (Majumdar and Mitra (1985)), etc..
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of prices and individual endowments. Next, the equilibrium price vector is
computed as the price for which the aggregate excess demand is zero for all
goods simultaneously. A Walrasian equilibrium is said to be ta^tonnement
stable if small deviations from the equilibrium allocation converge back to
the equilibrium, when prices are raised for goods with excess demand and
lowered for goods with excess supply. This describes a dynamic process where
demands are instantaneously adjusted to balance the individual budgets and
prices adjust `more slowly' in response to the excess demand or supply on
each market.
An alternative approach to compute equilibria in an exchange equilib-
rium, due to Negishi (1960), is to rst retrieve all allocation on the con-
tract curve together with the marginal rates of substitution (i.e. the shadow
prices). Subsequently, one needs to compute the welfare weights attached to
the agents in the economy (i.e. allocation on the contract curve) for which
the budget constraints of all individuals are simultaneously binding (given
the corresponding shadow prices). In order to make a distinction with the
approach above, we call this an equilibrium in welfare space. By construc-
tion, each equilibrium in welfare space corresponds to a unique Walrasian
quilibrium (and vice versa). See also Section 2 for more discussion.
Similarly to ta^tonnement stability, it is also possible to discuss the sta-
bility of the equilibria in welfare space. The dynamics are not determined
by price variations, but by variation in the welfare weights, which we de-
note by  . In this way, it is possible to distinguish between equilibria that
are -stable or -unstable. The dierence with the ta^tonnement adjustment
process is that for -stability, individual demands are immediately adjusted
in order to clear the markets, while welfare weights (and the corresponding
shadow prices) change `more slowly' in response to individual excess budgets
or decits. That is, in -stable equilibria, welfare weights are increased for
agents with a budget surplus and are decreased for agents with a budget
decit.
Our contribution. In this paper we provide a characterization of the
transfer paradox in terms of -stability of an equilibrium. As such, we com-
plement the existing literature, briey described above, which mainly focuses
on Walrasian equilibria. The main result of this paper is that the transfer
paradox takes place if and only if the equilibrium is -unstable. The intu-
ition for this result is as follows: a transfer of endowments from one agent to
3
another creates a budget surplus for the receiving agent. If the equilibrium
is -stable, then this surplus leads to an increase of the welfare weight for
this agent. This increase of the welfare weight, in turn, increases the equi-
librium utility level of the recipient. On the other hand, if the equilibrium is
-unstable, then the budget surplus of the receiving agent (due to the trans-
fer) decreases her welfare weight and, consequently, her equilibrium utility
level.
Using Balasko (2014)'s result, we obtain as a corollary of our characteri-
sation that in a two agent economy, the Walrasian equilibrium has index  1
if and only if the corresponding equilibrium in welfare space is -unstable.
Or, given that in a two agent economy -stability coincides with an index of
+1 in welfare space, we obtain that the index in welfare space coincides with
the index in p-space. This conclusion provides further insight for why the
transfer paradox does not always occur at ta^tonnement unstable equilibria.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section discusses the
concept of a welfare equilibrium and -stability in a two agent exchange
economy with an arbitrary number of goods. Section 3 presents our main
result. Section 4 concludes.
2 Welfare equilibria
We briey present the notions of an equilibrium in welfare space and the
link to the corresponding Walrasian equilibrium. See also Ginsburgh and
Waelbroeck (1979) and Mantel (1971) for more details.
We consider an exchange economy with n goods and two agents. We
denote the two agents by A and B and endow them with strictly monotone,
strictly concave and C1 utility functions uA and uB. Individual A consumes
the bundle qA 2 Rn+ and B consumes the bundle qB 2 Rn+. Endowments of
the individuals are given by !A 2 Rn+ and !B 2 Rn+. Let ! = !A + !B be
the aggregate endowment in the economy.
A price (row) vector p 2 Sn, where Sn is the unit simplex, is a Walrasian
equilibrium price vector if,
qA(p;p!A) + qB(p;p!B)  ! = 0;
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with
qA(p;p!A) = argmax
q
uA(q) s.t. pqA = p!A and,
qB(p;p!B) = argmax
q
uB(q) s.t. pqB = p!B:
At the equilibrium, both agents choose the optimal bundle subject to their
budget constraint, and equilibrium prices are determined by the fact that
all markets are simultaneously cleared (i.e. the excess demand functions are
zero).
An alternative way to determine the equilibrium allocation is by using the
dual approach of Negishi (1960). This approach departs from the following
welfare maximization program,
max
qA;qB
uA(q
A) + uB(q
B) s.t. qA + qB = !;
where   0 is a parameter that determines the welfare weight given to A
(relative to B). This maximization problem considers the bundles qA and
qB that maximize a weighted sum of utilities subject to the total resource
constraint.
Let qA(;!) and qB(;!) be the interior solution of this welfare max-
imization problem.3 Then, by varying  over R+ these bundles trace out
the entire contract curve (i.e. set of Pareto optimal allocations). Next, let
(;!) represent the vector of Lagrange multipliers of the welfare maximiza-
tion problem. From the rst order conditions, we obtain that at an interior
solution, for any two goods i and j,
@uA(qA(;!))
qAi
@uA(qA(;!))
qAj
=
i(;!)
j(;!)
=
@uB(qB(;!))
qBi
@uB(qB(;!))
qBj
:
As such, we see that the vector (;!) corresponds to the shadow prices of
the agents at the allocation (qA(;!);qB(;!)).
The welfare weight  is said to be an welfare equilibrium if
(;!)  (!A   qA(;!)) = 0:
3For simplicity, we will only focus to settings where the solutions are interior.
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Note that the vector (;!) corresponds to the equilibrium price vector,
which provides a formal link between our two types of equilibria.4 The above
condition requires that at the equilibrium, the total expenditure of agent A
should equal the total worth of her endowment. Using the resource constraint
and the fact that !B = ! !A, we immediately obtain that at an equilibrium,
the excess budget should also be equal to zero.
(;!)  (!B   qB(;!)) = 0:
Finally, let us dene the excess budget function for A,
b(;!A;!) = (;!)  (!A   qA(;!)):
The function b(;!A;!) is larger than zero if the worth of A's endowments
is larger than the worth of her consumption evaluated at the shadow prices.
Then,  constitutes a welfare equilibrium if and only if b(;!A;!) = 0.
This equilibrium is said to be -stable if
@b(;!A;!)
@
< 0:
The intuition is that local deviations from the equilibrium (by a change in 
from its equilibrium value) converge back to the equilibrium, by increasing 
if agent A has a budget surplus and decreasing  in cases of a budget decit.
In this two-agent setting, -stable equilibria have index +1 in welfare space
and -unstable equilibria have index  1.
It is important to note that, although there is a formal link between
the two types of equilibria, the (un)stability of the Walrasian equilibrium
should not always coincide with the (un)stability of the corresponding welfare
equilibrium. Indeed, as soon as there are more than two goods, it is possible
that there are equilbria that are p-unstable and -stable. For a more in-
depth discussion about the relation between the two ta^tonnement processes,
we refer to Mantel (1971) and Ginsburgh and Waelbroeck (1979). Below, we
will link -stability to the occurrence of a transfer paradox.
4For completeness, the ratio of the two Lagrange multipliers of the maximization prob-
lems in the Walrasian equilibrium is equal to the welfare weight. This provides the formal
link in the opposite direction.
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3 -stability and the transfer paradox
Applying the envelope theorem to the function,
W (;!) = max
qA;qB
uA(qA) + uB(qB) s.t. qA + qB = !
gives
dW (;!)
d
= uA(qA(;!)):
To simplify the notation, let us denote vA(;!)  uA(qA(;!)). By strict
convexity of W (;!), see Lemma 2 in the Appendix, we have
d2W (;!)
d2
=
@vA(;!)
@
> 0: (1)
Let !Bj > 0 and consider the following parametrization of the endowments,
!A(t) =
 
!A1 !
A
2 : : : !
A
j + t : : : !
A
r

:
!B(t) =
 
!B1 !
B
2 : : : !
B
j   t : : : !Br

:
By increasing t, we increase the transfer of endowment j from B to A. The
particular endowment, or combination of endowments that is transferred is
not really important for our reasoning below. As such the above chosen
parametrization is without loss of generality. Finally, notice that for all
values of t, !A(t) + !B(t) = !. In other words, aggregate endowments are
independent of t.
For each value of t in a neighbourhood around 0, consider the welfare
weight (t) associated to a regular equilibrium. Balasko (1992) showed
that the set of regular equilibria is an open dense subset of the equilibrium
manifold, so this restriction to regular equilibria is minor. We further assume
that (t) is dierentiable in t. Then we have that the welfare eects on A
of a small increase in the transfer from B to A (evaluated at t = 0) is given
by,
duA
dt

t=0
=
@vA((0);!)
@
d(0)
dt
:
7
We say that the transfer paradox occurs if A loses (and consequently, by
Pareto optimality, B gains) despite the increase in transfer from B to A; i.e.,
duA
dt

t=0
< 0:
Proposition 1. If the solution to the welfare maximization program is inte-
rior, then a transfer paradox occurs if and only if the welfare equilibrium is
-unstable.
Proof. We know that a transfer paradox occurs if and only if
@vA((0);!)
@
d(0)
dt
< 0:
From equation (1) we know that the rst term is strictly positive. As such,
the transfer paradox occurs if and only if
d(0)
dt
< 0:
Now, consider the excess budget function
b((t);!A(t);!) = ((t);!)  (!A(t)  qA((t);!)):
The equilibrium constraint requires that b((t);!A(t);!) = 0 for all t. As
such, dierentiating the equilibrium condition with respect to t, and evalu-
ating at t = 0 gives,
0 =
db
dt

t=0
=
@b((0);!A(0);!)
@
d(0)
dt
+
@b((0);!A(0);!)
@!Aj
() 0 = @b(
(0);!A(0);!)
@
d(0)
dt
+ j((0);!)
() @b(
(0);!A(0);!)
@
d(0)
dt
=  j((0);!):
The right hand side of this equality is negative because the Lagrange
multipliers (prices) are strictly positive. If the equilibrium is -stable, then,
by denition, we have that the rst factor on the left hand side, @b(
;!A;!)
@
,
is strictly negative. This means that d
(0)
dt
> 0 and thus implies that the
transfer paradox does not occur.
On the other hand, if the equilibrium is not stable, then @b(
;!A;!)
@
>
0, which means that d
(0)
dt
< 0 and, consequentially, the transfer paradox
occurs.
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4 Conclusion
We showed that in a two agent exchange economy with an arbitrary number
of goods, a transfer paradox occurs (at a regular equilibrium) if and only if
the welfare equilibrium is -unstable. This result complements the existing
literature, which mainly focuses on Walrasian equilibria.
Our result provides an alternative, and complimentary, explanation for
the relation between ta^tonnement stability and the transfer paradox. That is,
Balasko (2014) showed that in a two agent exchange model, with an arbitrary
number of commodities, the transfer paradox at a Walrasian equilibrium
if and only if the equilibrium has an index value of  1. Given that the
Walrasian equilibria with index value  1 are ta^tonnement unstable, this
demonstrates that a transfer paradox cannot occur at a stable equilibrium.
The opposite is however not true, which explains why the transfer paradox
does not always occur at unstable Walrasian equilibria.
Using Balasko's result, we obtain as a corollary of our characterisation
that in a two agent economy, the Walrasian equilibrium has index  1 if and
only if it the corresponding welfare equilibrium is -unstable. Or, given that
in a two agent economy -stability coincides with an index of +1 in welfare
space, we obtain that the index in welfare space coincides with the index
in p-space. As such we have shown that there can be equilibria that are
ta^tonnement unstable, but at the same time -stable. It is only at these
type of ta^tonnement unstable equilibria that the transfer paradox does not
occur.
For simplicity, and comparability to Balasko (2014), we restricted our-
selves to a setting with two agents. Given that there are unstable Walrasian
equilibria with an index of +1, it would be interesting to explore if a similar
result is true in welfare space. In other words, do there exist, in a setting
with more than two agents, unstable welfare equilibria at which the transfer
paradox does not occur? We leave this for future research.
A Proofs of the lemmata
Lemma 1. For interior solutions solutions of the welfare maximization pro-
gram, if  6= 0 then qA(;!) 6= qA(0;!).
Proof. Let us prove this ad absurdum and assume that qA(;!) = qA(0;!)
(and therefore also qB(;!) = qB(0;!)). Then the rst order conditions
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for welfare maximization program give
 =
@uB(qB(;!))
@qBi
@uA(qA(;!))
@qAi
=
@uB(qB(0;!))
@qBi
@uA(qA(0;!))
@qAi
= 0:
This contradiction proves the lemma.
Lemma 2. If the solution to the welfare maximization program is interior,
then W (;!) is strictly convex in .
Proof. Consider two values ; 0,  6= 0 and let
00 =  + (1  )0;
for some  2 [0; 1]. Let qA;qB, q0A;q0B and q00A;q00B be the optimal val-
ues for the maximization problem with ; 0 and 00 respectively and total
endowment !. Then,
W (;!) + (1  )W (0;!) =  uA(qA) +  uB(qB)
+ (1  )0uA(q0A) + (1  )uB(q0B)
  uA(q00A) +  uB(q00B)
+ (1  )0uA(q00A) + (1  )uB(q00B)
= 00uA(q00A) + uB(q00B) = W (00;!):
The inequality follows from the fact that qA;qB (resp. q0A;q0B) solve the
maximization problem for  (resp. 0) and that q00A;q00B satisfy the feasibility
constraint q00A + q00B = !. Intuitively, the result follows from the fact that
the objective function takes the maximum of a set of linear equations.
Using Lemma 1, we also have that, if  2]0; 1[, qA 6= q00A and qB 6= q00B,
then
uA(qA) + uB(qB) > uA(q00A) + uB(q00B):
If not, we would have that
uA(qA) + uB(qB) = uA(q00A) + uB(q00B):
By strict concavity, any convex combination of the bundles qA and q00A and
the same convex combination of qB and q00B would also be feasible and pro-
vide higher utility to both A and B. However, this contradicts the optimality
of qA and qB. As such, the weak inequality for the convexity proof can be
replaced by a strict inequality (if  2]0; 1[) which shows that W (;!) is
strictly convex in .
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